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RECENT DECISIONS
the exercise of this power would also be an unconstitutional taking, unless a distinc-
tion can be made as to the taking involved. A distinction might possibly be drawn
on the basis that obscene material is potentially more dangerous to public interests
than is fraudulent advertising. Such a distinction would involve the recognition of
a "constitutional" difference between the dissemination of obscene material and the
perpetration of fraud. Under this theory protection of a paramount public interest
would warrant the granting of summary, "emergency" power. Yet Congress has
already indicated that the public is entitled to summary protection from fraudulent
use of the mails. Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange
Commission have limited jurisdiction of the mails in fraud cases.35 If the interests
of the public require it, these commissions are empowered to bring suit in a federal
district court to enjoin alleged fraudulent use of the mails pending final adminis-
trative determination of actual fraud.38
In view of the possible far-reaching consequences of the instant decision, it
cannot pass without criticism. A contradiction exists between the court's due process
argument and its reasoning in denying that section 259 implicitly authorizes the issu-
ance of interim impounding orders in fraud cases. Either the court did not see this
contradiction or, in seeing it, made a distinction as to the taking involved in obscen-
ity and fraud cases. If such a constitutional distinction exists, then the instant deci-
sion is sound. However, it is submitted that such a distinction is unwarranted.
And, if this is so, then the constitutionality of section 259b has been placed in serious
doubt. Congress should, therefore, act to expressly authorize the use of interim
impounding orders by the Postmaster General in fraud order cases.
William R. Kennedy
NEWSPAPERS - CONTEMPT - IMPROPER COMMENTS ON PENDING JUDICIAL
ACTION. - The Supreme Court of Colorado heard on appeal a tax dispute between
the State Board of Equalization and Arapahoe County and, in announcing a de-
cision in favor of the board, delayed publication of its formal written opinion for
one week. At the time the decision was announced the opinion had been written,
but had not been prepared for publication. Four days later respondent published
an editorial in his newspaper attacking the decision,1 suggesting that it was in-
spired by political rather than legal considerations, 2 and intimating that popular
disapproval might result in a written opinion mitigating some of the decision's
rigor.3 Under Colorado procedure, the parties had time to file for rehearing. Two
days after the editorial - six days after the decision - a thirty-two page opinion
was printed. Two days after the publication the court, on its own motion, cited
respondent for constructive criminal contempt. Respondent filed an answer to the
citation and orally defended himself in an open hearing. Held; two of six parti-
cipating justices dissenting: not guilty. In Re Jameson, 340 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1959).
Contempt by publication, the common law court's most effective cudgel in defend-
ing itself from journalists, has been curtailed, if not obliterated, by a solid phalanx of
relatively recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Early opinions left de-
35 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2) (Supp. 1952) (SEC has jurisdiction of securities sent through the
mails). 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1) (1952) (FTC).
36 15 U.S.C. § 77t (b) (Supp. 1952) (SEC). 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1952) (FTC).
1 "the court has chiseled away more of our vanishing local governmental rights."
The Englewood Herald, Mar. 2, 1959; quoted in 340 P.2d 423, 424 (1959).
2 "Or could it be that the justices-they are elected state-wide, too - felt that the prob-
lem of getting politically powerful school teachers paid on time justifies the means used of
issuing a quick ruling without legal opinion in its support?" Ibid.
3 "Could it have been that if the populace should rise up in wrath that the opinion could
temper down the ruling, or, if it went almost unnoticed, the court could breathe easier and
file an opinion backing up its ruling to the hilt?" Ibid.
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termination of contempts largely up to state law,4 holding that if the publication
had "a reasonable tendency" to obstruct justice, freedom of speech and the press
were not offended by summary punishment for contempt.5 Since 1941, both federal8
and state7 courts have been limited in finding published contempt to those cases in
which there is "a clear and present danger" to the administration of justice.
Using a test first applied in a World War I espionage case," the court in Nye
v. United States9 denied to federal courts, and in Bridges v. California,° to state
courts, the broad summary power traditionally exercised by English judges.
Solidifying its position in Bridges, the court in the last eighteen years has ap-
plied the "clear and present danger" test with an unanimous record of reversals
of state convictions for contempt by publication.u Both courts and legal scholars
now generally recognize the test as controlling.1 State courts occasionally show a
tendency to use other standards, 8 but the tightening of contempt power has been
general, extending even to English-speaking courts outside the United States.'4
The Supreme Court's use of the fourteenth amendment as a virtual roadblock
to punishment for contempt by publication has escaped neither opposition nor
ambiguity. None of the leading cases has been decided without dissent's and no
dependable definition of the "clear and present danger" rule has emerged from the
half dozen discussions of it since Bridges.'1 6 It remains to conjecture whether the court
would be as rigorous in cases involving juries as it has been in appeals from cases
tried solely to the court 7 but there is apparently no permissable distinction to be
drawn between elected and appointed judges.""
Constructive contempt is a criminal offense punishable summarily without a
jury trial.' 9 It is ordinarily instituted by the offended court on its own motion and
is considered to be aimed at vindication of a public, as distinguished from a private,
wrong.2 0 Usual procedural safeguards are not required, as they are in civil contempt
proceedings. 2' The offense is predicated on the act and the tendency of the act;
4 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
5 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 403 (1918).
6 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
7 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), construing the Espionage Act, 40
Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
9 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
10 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
11 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
12 See People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385 (1957), and comment, 24 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 123 (1957); Note, The Contempt Power in Montana: A Cloud on Freedom of the
Press, 18 MONT. L. REv. 68 (1956). But cf. the test set forth in THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL
OF THE PRESS 489, 505-07 (3d ed., 1956). Thayer regards the old Toledo Newspaper test
of "reasonable tendency" and the Bridges test as alternatively valid.
13 The Florida court, possibly risking another Pennekamp, recently concentrated on a
litigant's right to fair trial to the exclusion of the Bridges yardstick. Brumfield v. State, 108
So.2d 33 (Fla. 1959).
14 See, e.g., John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. McRae, 93 Commw. L.R. 351 (Austl. 1955),
and Consolidated Press Ltd. v. McRae, 93 Commw. L.R. 325 (Austl. 1955). Cf. Comment,
7 REs JUDICATAE 195 (1955).
15 "I shall remain unreconciled, as long as I live, to the notion that the right of talking
takes precedence over the duty to conduct trials in the only way they can be conducted
fairly." Frankfurter, J., commenting during oral argument in In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1957); see U.S.L. WEEK 3331, 3332 (1958).
16 Justice Reed used six definitions in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333 (1946).
See Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
17 No constructive criminal contempt by publication involving a jury case has been
before the court since Bridges.
18 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947).
19 Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959).
20 MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1956).
21 Quezada v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 1018 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist., 1959). See
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
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intention to obstruct justice is important, but not strictly necessary, and disclaimer
of intent is probably not a valid defense.22
The case out of which the publication arises must be pending in a real, and
not merely technical, sense; 23 but exact determination of the meaning of "pending"
is still apparently a question of local law.24 At least one state retains a statute
punishing "contemptuous" statements concerning past judicial acts.25 A state court
has upheld the statute,26 but its survival under the "clear and present danger" test
before a federal court is at best dubious.
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in a court of law; statutes may
modify it procedurally, 7 but every legislative attempt to take it away entirely has
been jealously spurned.2 8 It is usually said that the court must have had jurisdiction
in the matter out of which the contempt arose.
2 9
The modem decisions on the subject make it crystal clear that the essential
purpose of contempt power is the assurance of a fair trial to litigants, rather than
protection of judicial dignity.30 As the Indiana court once colorfully put it, "what-
ever may bring the law into contempt is a public calamity which, if continued, will
eventually lead to anarchy and Bolshevism." 31
In any event, fair trial considerations must be viewed in the context of the
"clear and present danger" test. 2 This often necessitates a continuance or new trial
in cases where a litigant's rights are put in peril even though no contempt arises
under the modem rationale.3 3 To complicate the problem, defendants in criminal
actions have a right to a public trial, which presumably includes some amount of
publicity.
34
A court hearing a constructive criminal contempt action which originated
during previous litigation in the same forum faces the delicate choice of finding
the publisher guilty, and thereby admitting that it was influenced by the offending
words, 35 or vindicating its judicial impartiality and dismissing the citation. The
22 State v. Schumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 163 N.E. 272 (1928); Ray v. State, 186 Ind. 396,
114 N.E. 866 (1917); Regina v. Odhams Press Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 796 (1956). For discussion
of elements of the offense, see THAYER, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 498, and DANGEL, CON-
TEMPT 168, 169-70 (1939).
23 See concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J., in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 369
(1946); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923); Nixon v. State, 207 Ind. 426, 193 N.E. 591
(1935).
24 A determination not without its problems. See State v. District Court, 99 Mont. 33,
43 P.2d 249 (1935), following Grice v. District Court, 37 Mont. 590, 97 Pac. 1032 (1908).
25 VA. CODE ANN. § 18-255 (1950).
26 Weston v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E.2d 405 (1953).
27 Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 261, 28 Pac. 961 (1892); cf. Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
152 A.2d 726 (Pa. 1959), construing PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 1080 (1936).
28 Ex parte Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481 (1930); Telegram Newspaper Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899); In Re Assignment of Huff, 352 Mich.
402, 91 N.W.2d 613 (1958); State v. Goff, 288 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955).
29 Lane v. Bradley, 339 P.2d 583 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1959); Harvey v. Prall,
97 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 1959); State v. Olsen, 340 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1959).
30 See, e.g., Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
31 Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N.E. 194 (1922).
32 Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
33 A continuance was granted in United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), but denied in United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and Irvin
v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind. 1957). Whether or not a continuance is called for is
a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d
689 (1951); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958); Common-
wealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 8 A.2d 733 (1939). But interference with a fair
trial by the press is a constitutional ground for reversal. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50
(1951).
34 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
35 This admission lies at the core of the dissent in the instant case. 340 P.2d 423, 438
(1959). It becomes no less delicate when an appellate court considers the contempt conviction:
"To say that [the words] had the effect of intimidating, coercing or influencing the judge from
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Colorado court, in other words, had either to admit that Jameson's editorial dis-
turbed it enough to present an obstacle to justice or deny the effect of his words
and release him. If the publisher has merely attempted to influence, but has not
succeeded, he has, by the Colorado court's reasoning, not committed a contempt.58
Contempt, of course, is a weapon peculiar to the judicial arsenal which does
not foreclose use of more common weapons. A judge may certainly resort to the
courts for damages in cases involving libel; and the instant opinion implies that
Jameson may be liable for both criminal and civil libel.3 7 The court may give an
offending publisher a severe tongue-lashing and release him without risking reversal
on constitutional grounds.3 8 Indicating the availability of extra-legal pressures, the
instant court suggested that the newspapermen of Colorado should have been able
to prevent Editor Jameson's irresponsible journalism.
3 9
The Colorado court's decision is probably in accord with the judicial tempera-
ment since 1941. But future contempt cases, particularly those involving juries, may
of necessity retreat from a situation in which "the power theoretically possessed by
the State is largely paralyzed." 40
Thomas L. Shaffer
PROCEDURE- TRIAL BY JURY-UNLESS INADEQUACY OF LEGAL REMEDIES
CAN BE SHOWN LEGAL ISSUES MUST BE TRIED BY JURY PRIOR TO COURT TRIAL
OF THE EQUITABLE ISSUES. - Plaintiff brought action to enjoin the defendant from
instituting an antitrust suit against the plaintiff, requesting also a declaration that
a grant of clearance, whereby plaintiff was allowed to show first-run movies before
any other theater, was not in violation of the antitrust laws. The defendant counter-
claimed for treble damages under the antitrust laws and requested a trial by jury;
Upon affirmance by the court of appeals of the trial judge's decision to try the
equitable issues to the court prior to jury determination of the antitrust violations
charged in the counterclaim, and of his denial of defendant's demand for a jury
his course of duty is to fail to accord him the strength of character and judicial fortitude ...
so vividly exemplified by the long record of his judicial acts." Smotherman v. United States,
186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1950).
36 Contrast the instant decision, for instance, with the import of the following exchange
at the hearing:
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: Didn't you in fact say that as a result of public clamor, includ-
ing your own opinion, that this opinion might be withdrawn and otherwise be reversed
on that particular ground? Would you say that, that you were part of the clamor?
"MR. JAMESON: If you please, I would rather not answer the clamor.
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: You used something about the public rising up.
"MR. JAMESON: Yes, there's a reference to that sort of thing.
"MR. JUSTICE DAY: And you were part of the rising up against us, were you not,
the public rising up against us, and you inferred if it was loud enough, that the opinion
would be either tempered down or withdrawn, and that if it went unnoticed, then
the opinion would stand, that these were the things that determined it, isn't that what
you said?
"MR. JAMESON: I will let the editorial speak for itself.
"MR. JUSTICE HALL: You chose your words advisedly?
"MR. JAMESON: Yes, sir, I did." COLORADO PRESS AssOcIATIoN, SPECIAL LEGISLA-
TIVE AND LEGAL BULLETIN, Mar. 20, 1959, p. 12.
37 Editorial referred to as "defamatory," 340 P.2d 423, 427, 428; liability for libel is
discussed at 429.
38 This is an alternative not to be discounted. The instant court resorted to it, as the
Colorado Press Association predicted it would. COLORADO PRESS ASSOCIATION, CON17ENTIAL
BULLETIN, March 26, 1959, p. 1. The procedure has been followed in earlier cases. People v.
Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 Pac. 167 (1893); State v. Faulds, 17 Mont. 140, 42 Pac. 285
(1895); State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924).
39 340 P.2d 423, 429 (1959). Another instance: "The law-abiding, intelligent and patri-
otic people of this state will effectually settle the matter, if they are ever given an opportunity
to deal with it." State v. Shepherd, 117 Mo. 205, 76 S.W. 79 (1903).
40 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 532 (1951).
